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The emergence of platforms is shifting the locus 
of digital innovation to ecosystems on which 
numerous developers create extensions with 
additional functionalities. Despite all the potential 
benefits for complementors, however, this new 
organizing logic of digital innovation also introduced 
essential new risks. Recent studies in IS focused on 
risk of IT projects from a contingency perspective 
neglecting the complexity of ecosystems. In order to 
shed light on this, our work examines how app 
architecture as a complementor´s control mechanism 
and four types of ecosystem hazards shape the 
likelihood and impact of the risk of failure in third-
party innovation. By using a configurational 
approach based on fuzzy-set qualitative comparative 
analysis (FsQCA), we display complex interactional 
effects of the causal conditions on complementors’ 
perception of hazardous environments and thus 
provide valuable insights for both practice and 
theory on platform ecosystems. 
  
1. Introduction  
Pervasive digital technology significantly changes 
the logic of innovation. One of the most important 
aspects of organizing such innovation processes is 
shifting the locus of innovation on technological 
platforms [46, 59]. A digital platform, i.e. an 
extensible code base, allows the development of 
complementary products or services (e.g. 
applications) that augment a platform’s native 
functionality [50]. Companies offering such 
complementary applications are called 
complementors or third-party developers [18]. To 
accelerate innovation on digital platforms, platform 
owners have to create and sustain vibrant ecosystems 
of third-party developers [9]. Modular platform 
architecture enables complementors to develop their 
own apps independently, yet platform interfaces 
ensure their interoperability. This tendency towards a 
disintegrated architecture is mirrored by an 
increasing degree of interorganizational modularity, 
distributing the partitioning of innovation among 
many heterogeneous firms [5].  
Digital technology therefore creates several 
idiosyncrasies in the organizational logic of 
innovation [50]. First, the loosely coupled 
relationships between actors like the platform owner 
and single third-party developers represent a hybrid 
form of organizations which exhibits characteristics 
of both markets and formal alliances in the traditional 
sense of economic exchange theories [49]. Second, 
following this logic, control and knowledge is 
distributed between various actors [50]. Finally, such 
relations are frequently characterized by coopetition 
(i.e. simultaneous cooperation and competition). For 
instance, although platform owners encourage the 
development of third-party innovations, they might 
compete with complementors in certain market 
niches [12]. 
Although organizing digital innovation around a 
technological platform has created new business 
opportunities by providing complementary resources, 
it also introduced essential new risks. We refer to this 
phenomenon as risk of third-party innovation. In 
comparison to traditional risks of software 
engineering [7, 48], the locus of this form of risk is 
not within the own organizational boundaries but on 
platforms as well as within the focal complementor’s 
relationship multiple and heterogeneous actors. 
Exogenous and relation-specific factors like for 
instance opportunistic behavior of the platform 
owner, market related factors as well technological 
dependencies on the platform, thus constitute crucial 
threats which lay outside the direct control of a 
complementor. 
In order to theoretically explain the emergence of 
software development risks and provide IS 
management with means for its management, 
previous research proposes that successful 
organizations establish a fit between the degree of 
uncertainty of their environment and their structural 
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and control approaches [10]. This perspective 
extensively examined the role and interplay of 
control mechanism and environmental factors in 
influencing the risk of IT projects [34, 37]. 
In the context of third-party development on 
technological platforms, this perspective runs its 
limits for two main reasons. First, the contingency 
approach assuming the existence of a single state of 
fitness between control mechanisms and potential 
exogenous hazards is not able to capture the 
increasing dynamics and complexity of an ecosystem 
as the focus of IT innovation is shifting to platforms. 
We therefore utilize configuration theory [33] as 
theoretical lens to overcome the traditional 
reductionism problem [27] and examine the 
equifinality of different solutions for managing risk 
in ecosystems where a different set of elements can 
produce the same outcome. 
Second, complementors are typically not able to 
apply direct control mechanisms to govern third-
party innovation in platform ecosystems for reducing 
their risk. Congruent with previous work, which 
highlights the role of modular architecture as a 
control function for alliances [43] or to reduce 
opportunistic behavior [20] we argue that the 
modularization of application-platform linkages is the 
useful mechanism for complementors to manage the 
relation with the platform owner. 
Addressing these two shortcomings of previous 
research, the purpose of our work is therefore to shed 
light on complementors’ third-party innovation risk 
by explaining its prevalence based on different 
configurations exogenous hazards from the platform 
ecosystem as well as the microarchitecture of single 
applications which may serve as a safeguard against 
those hazards. We therefore address the following 
research question: Which configurations of 
architectural choices and ecosystem-related hazards 
minimize the complementor´s risk of third-party 
innovation? 
To answer these questions, our research analyzes 
data from a survey of 42 complementors on five 
leading cloud platforms using fuzzy set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (FsQCA) [33]. The FsQCA 
approach is a case-oriented method that enables 
analyzing asymmetric and complex causal effects by 
extracting configurations that consistently lead to the 
outcome of interest [14, 13]. 
Our study offers three noteworthy contributions. 
First, it outlines the influence of environmental 
hazards on the risk related to a major form of 
organizing digital innovation, platform-based 
application development. Second, it empirically 
validates the inseparability of environmental 
dynamics and architectural choices in such digital 
innovation settings. Third, it offers insights on how 
digital architecture can be utilized as a coordination 
device of complementors to manage 
interorganizational relations and to reduce risk. 
2. Conceptual background 
2.1. Risk of organizing third-party innovation  
In IS research, risk represents a function of both 
uncertainty and some kind of loss or damage, which 
is experienced by a decision maker [26]. A further 
crucial concept in this context is hazards, which is 
defined as a source of danger [21]. Consequently, if 
an actor is not able safeguard against such hazards, 
they create a potential loss, i.e. risks.  
Previous approaches examining risk in inter-
organizational arrangements like for instance R&D 
alliances [e.g. 31] or IT outsourcing [e.g. 3] are 
theoretically grounded in theories of economic 
exchange (i.e. transaction cost theory [49]). 
Following the logic stated in the introduction, 
however, we argue that the specific characteristics of 
digital technologies create also significant changes in 
the nature and analysis of risk. The loosely coupled 
relationships between the platform owner and a 
complementor represent a hybrid between 
characteristics of a market and an alliance. Therefore, 
significantly new uncertainties evolve for the 
participants of platform ecosystems. In particular, the 
distribution of control and knowledge among 
heterogeneous actors accelerates uncertainty 
regarding the technology itself or the behavior of the 
alter [12, 50].  For instance, the platform owner´s 
control over boundary resources (i.e. software 
development kit (SDK) application programming 
interfaces (APIs)) makes complementors increasingly 
dependent [18]. This limits third-party developers’ 
space to control the exchange with the platform 
owner itself. Furthermore, as this new organizing 
logic of digital innovation frequently requires 
coopetition (i.e. simultaneous cooperation and 
competition) to drive innovation, complementors 
may suffer from platform owners to adopt and 
modify their applications in order to capture 
attractive market niches [12]. While platform owners 
encourage the development of third-party 
innovations, the loss of intellectual property is 
therefore a common threat in this context [6].  
The risk of third-party innovation as an outcome 
variable is therefore defined as the potential failure of 
the complementor´s innovation effort in a loosely 
coupled and coopetitive relationship with the 
platform owner. This concept has two distinctive sub 
dimensions [31]: risk likelihood (i.e. the probability 
that the digital innovation effort will fail) and risk 
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impact (i.e. the perceived possible loss in the form of 
missing or underachieving the goals of the innovation 
effort). While the first sub dimension is mainly 
resulting from uncertainty, the latter is accelerated by 
the specificity of a digital platform and the resulting 
migration costs to another technology. 
 
2.2. A configurational perspective on 
organizing digital innovation 
In IS, researchers adopt a contingency approach 
risk management to examine the role and interplay of 
control mechanism and environmental factors in 
influencing the risk of IT projects [35, 38]. This 
approach has been strongly influenced by research in 
organizational contingency theory, which proposes 
that successful organizations ensure a unifinality of 
fit between the degree of uncertainty of their 
environment and their structures [11]. Rather than 
assuming the existence of best-fitting combinations 
of predictor variables, we assume equifinality of 
different configuration of variables Thereby, we take 
a holistic viewpoint which abstains from evaluating 
net effects of single variables but treats such 
configurations in a whole as explanatory factors for 
the outcome of interest. Such an application of 
configurational theory in the context of digital 
innovation in platform ecosystems is suitable for two 
reasons.  
First, in configurational approaches whole sets of 
elements serve to simultaneously explain the 
outcomes of interest [13].  Because of that, 
configurational theory is particularly appropriate to 
explain synergetic and complementary causalities 
[33]. This resonates well with current theoretical 
perspectives on the organizing logic of digital 
innovation in general and platform and ecosystem 
management in specific. Research in this field 
highlights the inseparability of ecosystem dynamics 
from app architectures and their mutual effect on 
innovation outcomes. Therefore, examining variable 
in isolation therefore is no reasonable approach 
towards explaining risk in third-party development.  
On the other hand, recent organizational [14] and 
information systems research [25] suggests that the 
assumption of symmetric causal relationships might 
not adequately display organizational realities [13]. 
In contrast, configurational theories imply 
equifinality between different sets of initial 
conditions [33] and assume asymmetric rather than 
symmetric relations between conditional variables 
and outcomes [13]. Consequently, corresponding 
analysis procedures allow for the detection of 
sufficient or necessary causes of a dependent 
variable.  For instance, while the existence of a 
particular hazard might consistently lead to high risk 
for complementors, this does not mean that its 
absence will lead to low levels of risk (e.g., there 
might be other hazards which substitute for it). 
Considering these advantages of configurational 
perspective, we argue that understanding 
organizational outcomes of the distributed organizing 
logic of digital innovation strongly depends on 
configuration of several design choices with its 
environment. 
 
2.3. Research framework 
Fig. 1 illustrates the framework of this article. We 
divided the concept of third-party innovation risk into 
two distinctive dimensions: risk likelihood (i.e. the 
probability that the digital innovation effort will fail) 
and risk impact (i.e. the perceived possible loss). The 
framework comprises two facets of causal conditions 
for risk. It proposes that from the perspective of 
complementors, the configuration of four exogenous 
hazards (i.e. platform specificity; behavioral, market 
& technological uncertainty) and two endogenous 
choices to manage their innovation effort (i.e. app 
decoupling and standardization of interfaces) 
influence the risk of third-party innovation. 
 
Figure 1. Research framework 
 
In the selection of our causal conditions, we 
follow notions of Tiwana et al. [46] on intra-platform 
dynamics and the required fit of architecture and 
environmental dynamics to process strategic 
outcomes. Our set of causal conditions therefore 
includes design elements outside (hazards of the 
ecosystem) as well as within (app decoupling and 
standardized interfaces) the range of complementors’ 
influence and is theoretically guided by the 
dimensions of transaction cost theory [49]. 
Platform specificity: The specificity of a certain 
platform represents the first hazard for a 
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complementor. Platform specificity refers to the 
transferability of a complementor´s application to a 
different platform [4] as well as the value of 
complementor´s assets within alternative partner 
relations [36]. For instance, platforms require 
investments in relation-specific knowledge to 
participate in the platform ecosystem and capitalize 
from the access to complementary resources and 
capabilities [3]. Specific assets can be for instance, 
human assets, technological assets or knowledge 
about platform architecture, interface specifications 
and market characteristics. High levels of asset 
specificity and the related investment requirements 
create dependence between partners, lead to lock-in 
effects which make it difficult for the complementors 
and move to another platform [22]. A high specificity 
of assets required for building complementary 
products therefore results for instance in high multi-
homing costs [2]. Therefore the amount of a potential 
loss is likely to be higher under conditions of high 
platform specificity. 
The second exogenous hazard for complementors 
in platform ecosystems is uncertainty, which is most 
commonly defined as the absence of complete 
information about the contextual environment. This 
in turn leads to an inability to predict it accurately 
[29]. The concept of uncertainty is crucial in 
organization theory and frequently applied in studies 
on risk in IS [29]. For the purpose of our study we 
define uncertainty rather on the interorganizational 
environment than on the project level. On this level 
we apply an environmental perspective on 
uncertainty, which explains the unpredictability of 
the firm's environment surrounding a relationship 
between firms [16, 44].  
Market uncertainty: Market conditions are crucial 
drivers for the risk of complementors, as for instance 
the sustainability of the specific niche is required to 
succeed. Volatile customer demand, the 
unpredictable emergence of new substitute products 
or changes in the competitive environment might 
increase the threat of failure during the development 
of complementary products.  
Technological uncertainty: Furthermore, 
technological unpredictability covers the inability to 
accurately forecast the technological requirements 
within the relationship, which is especially important 
in complementary platform markets. Technological 
complexity and changes are the most significant 
sources of uncertainty [29]. Technological 
uncertainty is also frequently related to a lack of 
experience with the technologies employed in the 
ecosystem [30], which increases the threat of failure 
due to inadequate capabilities. Furthermore, the 
unpredictability of technological evolution might 
constitute a source of risk during third-party 
innovation [46]. 
Behavioral uncertainty: In contrast to 
environmental uncertainty, which is not directly 
related to the partner, behavioural uncertainty arises 
from the complexity and difficulty of evaluating each 
other’s actions within a relationship. Taken to the 
platform context, the platform owner might follow its 
individual interests and cause hidden costs by 
inefficient and ineffective behavior [49]. Moreover, 
although platform owners encourage the development 
of complementary products to nurture the overall 
value of the ecosystem [37], there is often a tension 
between them and complementors. This tension 
arises from the complementor´s threat of 
opportunistic behavior of the platform owner by for 
instance exploiting resources or competing in the 
partner’s niche [22]. 
Building on Tiwana [46], who outlines the 
required fit of application architecture and platform 
dynamics we extend this line reasoning to the risk of 
third-party innovation. Prior works highlight that the 
role of modular architecture as control mechanism to 
influence the outcome of interorganizational 
arrangements [43] or to reduce opportunistic 
behavior [20]. Therefore, third-party developers 
possess design alternatives based on which they can 
influence the governance of their relation to the 
platform. Concretely, the microarchitecture (in 
contrast to the macro-architecture of the overall 
platform) of their apps allows complementors to 
minimize risk by exploiting the benefits of 
modularization [44, 45]. On the micro level of 
application architecture, we focus on the 
modularization of the app-platform linkages rather 
than internal modular app architectures. App 
modularization therefore minimizes the application–
platform dependencies on the degree to which an app 
is required to be conforming to the specified interface 
that is vice versa determined by the platform owner 
[44, 45]. Hence, applications within the same 
ecosystem can significantly vary in their level of 
modularization [28] as its micro-architecture reflects 
an endogenous choice of the complementor. 
App Decoupling: Decoupling allows for changes 
within a module which do not require parallel 
changes in the platform and vice versa. App 
decoupling reduces dependencies at the boundary 
between app and platform and minimizes the 
interactions between both [46]. Hence, the 
technological volatility of a platform does not 
necessarily require changes in the single application. 
It enables the flexible and independent development 
of apps. Third-party developers are therefore able to 
adapt the application´s internal implementation 
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without the need of knowledge about internal details 
of the platform [39]. 
Standardized interfaces: Standardization refers to 
the use of standards and protocols predefined by the 
platform owner (e.g., platform specific APIs) that are 
applied to meet conformance between the platform 
and the complementor´s applications. Such standards 
are introduced by a platform owner to manage the 
relationships between the app and the platform. 
Standardization reduces the need for iteration 
between the complementor and the platform owner 
and ensures interoperability between the platform and 
the app. This underlines the role of standardized 
interfaces as a control mechanism [44, 45]. 
 Both mechanisms allow complementors to 
developed apps independently and ensure 
interoperability with the platform and represent an 
architectural control mechanism to manage their 
innovation activities in the ecosystem. 
3. Research methodology 
3.1. Data collection and sample description 
Our sample of firms 750 firms which are 
members of five leading cloud platforms (i.e. 
Microsoft Azure, Oracle Cloud Platform, Amazon 
Web Services, SAP HANA, and Salesforce 
Force.com). There were two reasons for choosing 
these particular platforms. First, all platforms are 
well-established and have solid traction among third-
party developers. Second, in all five platforms, a high 
level of power imbalance is prevalent, so that they 
perfectly meet our requirements for analyzing 
asymmetric third-party relationships. 
Key informant data was collected via a web 
crawling approach which randomly gathered contacts 
from the platforms´ app stores. This approach is 
consistent with previous surveys of third-party 
developers [8]. The potential respondents were 
contacted via an e-mail containing information on the 
research project, a link to the online questionnaire as 
well as the request to complete the survey or to 
forward the questionnaire to other executives (C-
level; IT executives) as further potential key 
informants [23]. 
In total, we obtained complete data on N=42 
cases. This equals a response rate of 5.6 %, a 
common value in such settings [e.g. 8]. We assessed 
this possibility by comparing responses of early and 
late respondents [2]. T-tests did not reveal any 
significant differences (p > 0.05) rejecting the 
presence of non-response bias in our dataset. 
Complementors from all five platforms replied 
(Microsoft Azure: 9; Oracle Cloud Platform: 4; 
Amazon Web Services: 2; SAP HANA: 9; and 
Salesforce Force.com: 14). Most of them were high-
level executives (C-level: 71.4 %; BU executives: 19 
%) and indicated high experience in managing 
platform-based software development (>10 years: 
83.3 %). 
3.2. Measurement validation  
Based pilot study with managers in the software 
industry, we constructed our measurement 
instrument. In order to ensure validity, reliability as 
well as rigor of our research [24], we adapted 
existing scales to the platform context and refined 
them based on the insights from the pilot study. 
Subsequently, these refined items were evaluated in a 
pre-test procedure. This helped us ascertaining that 
the formulation of all items was unambiguous and 
comprehensible.  
Table 1 displays the psychometric statistics of the 
measured constructs. There is strong evidence for 
adequate reliability with Cronbach’s α greater than 
.85 for all variables. Furthermore, we can assert 
discriminant validity as confirmatory factor analysis 
yielded adequately high factor loadings concerning 
so that the Fornell/Larcker criterion is fulfilled for all 
our study variables [13]. 
Table 1. Construct measures 
 
To reject the possibility of common method bias, 
we conducted Harman’s one-factor test [27]. The 
unrotated factor solution resulted in 5 factors 
explaining 77 % of the variance (35 % was the 
largest variance explained by one factor). Hence, 
common method bias is unlikely to be a problem. 
3.3. Fuzzy-set QCA 
We chose FsQCA as means to analyze the 
obtained data. This set-theoretic approach is utmost 
suitable to configurational theories as it aims at 
extracting whole configurations rather than single 
factors that help to explain outcomes of interest [14]. 
Thereby, FsQCA draws on set-based measures of 
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consistency and coverage in order to evaluate the 
predictive power of the potentially possible 
conditional configurations. Consistency values 
display to which degree cases that share a certain 
combination of conditions also lead to a specific 
outcome [33]. Hence, this indicator is analogous to 
correlation estimates in statistical methods. The other 
indicator of quality, coverage, represents the degree 
to which a configuration covers the instances on 
which a specific outcome is realized. Defined as 
such, the meaning of coverage values resembles that 
of R-square values in regression analysis. The 
FsQCA procedure consists of three steps through 
which consistent configurations are detected [33]: 
calibration, construction of truth tables, truth table 
analysis. 
Calibration of construct measures is necessary 
because FsQCA as a set-theoretic analysis approach 
draws on membership scores (here, e.g. membership 
in the group of firms with highly decoupled apps) 
rather than values on interval or ratio scales. In our 
study, we thus transformed the Likert scale measures 
into fuzzy set membership scores. These range 
between 0 and 1 with 0 indicating full non-
membership, 1 indicating full membership and 0.5 
marking the crossover point [40]. We follow the 
calibration approach outlined by Fiss [14] and chose 
the observed maximum and minimum values within 
the sample to specify full membership and full non-
membership for all variables. The median of 
observed values served as cross-over point. Based on 
these three values, the calibration procedure in the 
FsQCA software program (version 2.5) [34] 
transforms all obtained measures to membership 
scores. 
The second step of FsQCA is the construction and 
refinement of a matrix of all possible configurations 
of antecedent conditions (in our case a 64x6 matrix; 
in general 2
k
xk, with k as the number of conditions 
observed [33]). In order to fit the requirements of 
FsQCA, this truth table must subsequently be refined. 
This procedure evaluates each possible configuration 
on the basis of two criteria: frequency and 
consistency. The frequency assesses which of the 
possible configurations actually appear in the dataset. 
In Large samples, it is often reasonable to exclude 
infrequent cases so that it is necessary to set a 
frequency threshold for the inclusion of 
configurations in the further analysis procedure. As 
our sample is medium-sized in terms of FsQCA 
literature, we chose the standard threshold of 1 which 
is suitable for samples of this size [40]. The 
consistency criterion captures if a truth table row 
consistently yields an outcome.  The consistency 
value thereby should outreach at least .8 [33], so we 
chose a rather conservative threshold of .9. Overall, 
in 28 cases, configurations exceeded the frequency 
threshold of which 13 also exceeded the consistency 
threshold for risk likelihood and 17 for risk impact. 
In the third step, the truth tables are analyzed via 
counterfactual analysis. This approach is based on 
Boolean algebra in general and applies the Quine-
McCluskey algorithm in particular. This algorithm 
strips away factors which are not consistently present 
concerning a particular outcome [14] in order to 
identify the conditions within a configuration which 
cause the outcome. Hence, the algorithm excludes 
conditions that are no essential part of a sufficient 
configuration for the respective outcome and 
produces two distinct solutions: the parsimonious 
solution and the intermediate solution. The 
parsimonious solution on the one hand draws on all 
simplifying assumptions derived from 
counterfactuals. It passes a more thorough reduction 
procedure, so that the data provides strong empirical 
evidence for the causality of these conditions. 
Therefore, the parsimonious solution encompasses 
the causal core of conditional variables. In contrast, 
the intermediate solution only includes simplifying 
assumptions based on easy counterfactuals [33]. The 
conditional variables which appear in the 
intermediate solution but do not appear in the 
parsimonious solution thus represent the causal 
periphery of a configuration [14]. 
4. Results 
The results of the FsQCA reveal several patterns 
that explain how different configurations of app 
architecture and environmental hazards result in high 
or low levels of both risk likelihood and risk impact. 
We extracted these patterns by comparing structures 
of different configurations [14]. Figure 2-5 show the 
configurations resulting from FsQCA. Black circles 
indicate the presence of a condition, crossed-out 
circles indicate the absence of a condition, large 
circles indicate core condition, and small circles 
indicate peripheral conditions. Blank spaces indicate 
a condition may be either present or absent. 
4.1. Configurations for achieving high 
likelihood of risk 
We identified seven different configurations that 
result in a high likelihood of risk. Consistency for 
configurations ranges from 0.90 to 0.99. Raw 
coverage, which describes the importance of a certain 
configuration in explaining the intended outcome, 
range from 0.26 to 0.46. The overall solution 
consistency shows these seven solutions can 
consistently result in high likelihood of risk with 89 
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%. The overall solution coverage indicates that the 
extent to which these seven configurations cover high 
likelihood of risk cases is 76 %. We compared the 
seven configurations of our analysis to extract two 
strong patterns:  
I) In platform ecosystems with a high level of 
market uncertainty complementors are very likely 
to perceive a high likelihood of risk in third-party 
innovation (2a&b; 3a&b), which can be explained 
by the increased likelihood for market disruption 
or instability of the complementor´s niche.  
II) If the interfaces are not standardized and market 
uncertainty is high (3a&b), especially with lack of 
app decoupling as peripheral condition, the 
likelihood of risk for complementors is high as 
changing market conditions might increase the 
need for adaptions in the application. However, if 
apps are not modularized, complementors are not 
able to improve the application fast and 
independently. Therefore, lack of modularization 
reduces the flexibility to react to changes within 
the market environment. 
 
Figure 2. Configurations for high risk 
likelihood 
4.2. Configurations for achieving high impact 
of risk 
Furthermore, we identified seven different 
configurations that result in a high impact of risk that 
exceed minimum consistency threshold. These seven 
solutions consistently result in high risk impact with 
89 % and cover 81 % of cases with this outcome. 
Comparing the seven configurations reveals two 
further important patterns: 
III) The impact of complementor´s risk in third-
party innovation is high when the environment 
is volatile. In particular, market uncertainty 
(2a, b, c; 4a & b) and technological 
uncertainty (1; 4a&b) are the main hazards to 
result in a high impact of risk.  
IV) The interplay of high interface standardization 
and low app decoupling (3) represents the 
second pattern to create a high impact of risk. 
This can be explained as high standardization 
requires high investment of the complementor 
to adhere platform-specific interface standards 
while a lack of decoupling reduces flexibility 
and increases the threat of cascading ripple 
effects that might disrupt its interoperability 
with the platform. 
 
 
Figure 3. Configurations for high risk impact 
 
4.3. Configurations for achieving low 
likelihood of risk 
Figures 4 and 5 show the configurations for a low 
level of risk. We compared these sets of causal 
conditions with the configurations that lead to high 
risk to detect relevant differences. Consequently, we 
identified six configurations that result in a low 
likelihood of risk. These solutions consistently result 
in a low likelihood of risk with 91 % and cover 72 % 
of cases with this outcome. Comparing the six sets of 
causal conditions we extracted three further patterns: 
V) If behavioral uncertainty is missing, 
complementors perceive a low likelihood of 
risk (1a&b; 2a&b), although technological 
uncertainty is high (1a&b). This shows that 
complementors that are able to monitor the 
behavior of the platform owner face a lower 




VI) Configurations of market uncertainty in 
presence with an absence of technological 
uncertainty account for low risk likelihood 
(3a&b) if the company does not draw on app 
decoupling. This fact can be explained as 
technological stability allows the 
complementor to reduce risk by offering 
ability to react to changes in the market 
quickly. Under these circumstances app 
decoupling does not offer additional benefits. 
VII) Likelihood of third-party innovation risk is 
low when interfaces are highly standardized 
(2a&b), which reflects the role of interfaces to 
standardize rules that apps ought to obey and 
can expect the platform to obey. This 
underlines the role of app architecture as a 
control mechanism for risk. 
 
 
Figure 4. Configurations for low risk likelihood 
 
4.4. Configurations for low impact of risk 
By analyzing cases for a low impact of risk, we 
uncovered six different configurations that result in a 
low impact of risk. These solutions consistently result 
in that outcome with 90 % and cover 83 % of cases 
with a low level of risk impact. By comparing these 
configurations for low risk impact, we found two 
final patterns: 
VIII) Surprisingly, the specificity of a platform is 
not a main driver of risk impact but its missing 
predicts low impact of potential losses (1; 
3a&b; 4). From this finding we can derive that 
complementors do not perceive failure to have 
a high impact on them when they did not 
heavily invested in knowledge and other 
resources that are idiosyncratic for this certain 
platform or app migration to another platform 
can be easily achieved.  
IX) If uncertainty in the ecosystem is low, 
complementors face a low level of risk 
impact. Especially, when behavioral and 
technological uncertainty are missing (2; 4; 5). 
This shows the interplay of a reduced space 
for opportunism and the stability of the 
platform in reducing risk. 
 
 
Figure 5. Configurations for low risk impact 
 
4.5. The drivers of risk and the role of app 
architecture 
From the nine pattern identified in the comparison 
of configurations that lead to high and low risk, we 
are able to reveal holistic insights of the drivers of 
third-party innovation risk and the role of app 
architecture as a control mechanism. Based on the 
commonalities among the patterns, we identified 
three holistic findings to explain the risk of third-
party innovation and its management. 
First, uncertainty of the platform owner´s 
behavior as well as the specificity of a platform, are 
no main drivers of complementor´s risk. Instead 
configurations in which both are absent display a low 
impact and likelihood of risk during digital 
innovation. Hence, while environmental hazards are 
needed to turn specific assets and opportunistic 
partners into considerable drivers of risk, engaging 
with reliable partners or acting on platform with low 
asset specificity might at least partially mitigate the 
impact of environmental hazards. 
Second, market and technological uncertainty are 
the main drivers of risk in digital innovation. 
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Unstable market conditions and technological 
volatility are crucially influencing the impact and 
likelihood of risk during third-party innovation. 
Third, application architecture represents not a 
direct control mechanism to govern the platform 
dependencies during digital innovation. 
Standardization of interfaces might rather represent a 
necessary condition to achieve a low level of risk 
under certain circumstances. Consequently, the use of 
standardized interfaces is required to minimize risk. 
However, if apps are highly modularized, this does 
not necessarily imply low levels of risk but the effect 
rather depends on the environment. 
5. Conclusion 
By comparing different configurations that result 
in high and low risk, we identified nine patterns that 
describe the role of environmental hazards and app 
architecture in shaping risk. From these patterns we 
derive the role of technological and market 
uncertainty as core drivers of risk. Furthermore, our 
findings reveal that behavioral uncertainty and 
platform specificity are not drivers of risk per se. 
However, their absence is required to achieve low 
levels of risk. In addition, we detect the role of app 
architecture as a control mechanism for third-party 
innovation. As the absence of app modularity is 
always implying a high level of risk, it is a necessary 
condition for minimizing risk. 
Therefore, the contribution of our study is 
threefold. First, it contributes to research of risk in IS 
by applying a configurational perspective on the new 
organizing logic of digital innovation and providing 
evidence for the equifinality of different paths in 
reducing risk. Second, our research contributes to 
past work on platform dynamics [46, 13] and intra-
platform management [44, 45] by uncovering the 
interplay of environmental factors and technological 
architecture in achieving organizational outcomes. 
Third, we contribute to previous studies on 
modularization as control mechanism [43, 44, 45] by 
revealing app modularization as necessary condition 
to minimize risk. 
From a practical point of view, our results show 
that app developers should use app decoupling and 
standardized interfaces to reduce risk particular in 
uncertain environments. Further research in this 
direction could possibly focus on the interplay of app 
architecture and governance mechanism, which are 
introduced by the platform owner, to provide an even 
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